The quantum mechanics distinction is not between "global" variables and "local" variables, but rather between "distant" variables and "local" variables. Bell's inequality proves that quantum effects cannot be accounted for by locally acting variables not yet understood. Because "entangled" particle pairs share quantum effects (I am mangling the quantum mechanics description a bit for brevity) at a distance (farther than a light speed message can travel in the time under consideration - what Einstein called "spooky action at a distance") in ways that cannot be predicted except in a general statistical manner we are left with no ability to specifically predict the behavior of the entangled particles, nor can we expect that the unpredictability is due to current ignorance of some effect that will surface in the future (no hidden local variables). This lack of predictability does not appear to me to relate in a meaningful way to what I understand to be the issue in determinism - namely, does will have a role in determining the future. The fact that we cannot predict an outcome does not lend any support to a thesis that outcomes are determined by will. Casual readers are often led astray by the terminology used in quantum mechanics. Terms such as "observer" and "measurement" appear to open the door to will having a causal role, but that is misusing the terms - in no way do these terms imply willful control of outcomes, they only specify times when unpredictable outcomes might become known.
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